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AFDC ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS UNRELATED TO NEED: THE
IMPACT OF DUBLINO
The problem of defining the limits of state discretion in determining
standards for eligibility in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program (AFDC)1 has been a source of continuing controversy. The
Supreme Court's invalidations of state-imposed eligibility conditions
unrelated to need2 in King v. Smith,3 Townsend v. Swank,4 and Carleson
v. Remillard' have been interpreted as setting up a test for the validity
of such conditions.' This test requires that no state exclude any class
of individuals eligible for assistance under federal standards absent con-
gressional authorization for an exclusion. Except where authorization
exists, these decisions seem to eliminate the potential for state variance
with federal standards on AFDC eligibility.
A 1973 Supreme Court opinion, New York State Department of
Social Services v. Dublino,7 casts doubt on the continuing viability of
the King-Townsend-Carleson test for the validity of state-imposed
eligibility conditions. The broadest implications of the Dublino opinion
suggest that the test developed in King and its progeny has been modi-
fied and that states, contrary to the impression left by the earlier cases,
may retain greater discretion in determining eligibility for their AFDC
programs.
This note considers the development of judicial treatment of state-
imposed eligibility conditions unrelated to need in the AFDC program.
After a review of the holdings on state-imposed eligibility conditions
in the King, Townsend, and Carleson cases and of the interpretation that
has been given to these holdings, this note focuses on the Dublino case
and its potential alteration of that interpretation. Finally, attention is
given to the future impact of Dublino.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
2. The term "eligibility conditions unrelated to need" refers to eligibility require-
ments independent of a family's need or income. The distinction between need-related
conditions and nonneed-related eligibility is often difficult to make. However, nonneed-
related conditions generally result in termination of benefits whereas need-related condi-
tions result in the diminution of the amount of benefits. Comment, AFDC Eligibility Re-
quirements Unrelated to Need: The Impact of King 10. Snith, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1219,
1241 (1970) [hereinafter cited as AFDC Eligibility].
3. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
4. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
5. 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
6. See notes 42-44 infra & text accompanying.
7. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
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ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS UNRELATED TO NEED
PRIOR TO DUBLINO
The AFDC program is one of the categorical assistance programs8
established by the Social Security Act.' The combination of federal
financial participation and state administration has caused the program
to be characterized as one of "cooperative federalism."1 In order to
qualify for federal funds, a state must develop a conforming plan subject
to approval by the Secretary of the Department of Ri-alth, Education, and
Welfare (HEW)." Since one of the conformity requirements is that
states must furnish aid with "reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals,"' 2 the question of whether states may vary from the some-
times ambiguous federal eligibility standards is central to the determina-
tion of the validity, as well as the delineation of the scope, of any state
AFDC program.
Since the inception of the program, there has been a general recog-
nition of a state's right to establish the standard of need and to determine
the level of benefits.' 8  However, Congress did set out certain federal
eligibility standards. Under the Act's definitions, needy children who
are living with one or more named relatives, and who have been deprived
of parental support or care and who meet specific age or school attendance
requirements are eligible for assistance.' 4 Disputes have frequently arisen
over the degree to which the conformity requirements and the federal
eligibility definitions limit a state's right either to adopt more limited
8. There are three other such programs: Old Age Assistance; Aid to the Blind;
and Aid to the permanently and Totally Disabled. These programs are codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 801-05 (Supp. II, 1972).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972) [hereinafter
referred to as the Act].
10. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 542 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970) ; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970).
12. Id. § 602(a) (10).
13. E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19, citing H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 24 (1935), and S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 36 (1935).
14. The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is
living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister
stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew,
or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives
as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B)
under the age of twenty-one and . . . a student regularly attending a school,
college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical
training designed to fit him for gainful employment.
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). Eligibility not only entitles the family to a monthly cash
payment but also to medical assistance and to certain rehabilitative services. Id. §
606(b).
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definitions of the target category or to impose collateral conditions of
eligibility.
In the early history of the AFDC program, improper state-imposed
eligibility conditions unrelated to need were subject to negotiation or
invalidation upon federal administrative review.' 5 If the nonconformity
was not corrected after the state had received notification thereof and
been given an opportunity for a hearing, the Secretary of HEW could
terminate federal funding to the nonconforming state. 6 Reliance upon
administrative review proved unsatisfactory because of a variety of
factors." One of these was the lack of formal procedures by which an
individual could initiate a conformity hearing. Another factor was the
development in HEW of a pattern of settling disputes by negotiation
rather than conformity hearings and a reticence to apply the only sanction
available--the termination of federal funding.' In addition, the delay
inherent in HEW review2 and the unavailability of more favorable
remedies were central factors in prompting claimaxits to seek another
forum. Through the combination of these factors, more eligibility dis-
putes were brought before the federal courts.2"
The first AFDC eligibility case to reach the Supreme Court was
King v. Smith.22 King involved a challenge to the Alabama "substitute
father" rule. Under the federal criteria, a needy child deprived of
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from
the home, or the physical or mental incapacity of a parent is eligible
for assistance.23 Under the Alabama rule, a needy child deprived of
15. For the general history of administrative treatment of improper state eligibility
conditions see AFDC Eligibility, supra note 2, at 1221-25.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1970).
17. See generally W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN, 174-98 (1965); Herzer,
Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV.
Lm. L. R-v. 1, 9-10 (1970) ; Note, Federal Judicial Review ol State Welfare Practices,
67 CoLum. L. REv. 84, 90-96 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Review].
18. Judicial Review, mipra note 17, at 91.
19. See authorities cited note 17 supra.
20. To illustrate the potential for delay, the negotiations between HEW and the
state of Alabama concerning the validity of the "substitute father" rule and its prede-
cessors which was challenged in King began in 1959 and were still continuing in 1967
when the controversy reached the federal courts. HEW had never approved the rule
but had taken no action against the state of Alabama other than to inform the state
that the rule did not conform with 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1970). King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 326 n.23 (1968).
21. Increased availability of legal services for welfare recipients and the fact
that the individual state fair hearings did not establish a binding body of law also
contributed to the selection of the judicial forum. Judicial Review, supra note 17, at
90-96.
22. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
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parental support or care by the death or continued absence of his natural
father could be denied assistance if his mother cohabited with another
man.24 The state of Alabama argued that it was within the state's
power to discourage immorality and illegitimacy through the denial of
AFDC assistance.2" In addition, Alabama maintained that the presence
of the "substitute father" meant the child was not deprived of parental
support or care.26 In invalidating the Alabama rule, the Supreme Court
held that federal standards did not allow for Alabama's interpretation
of the term "parent" as including a "substitute father."27 Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the majority, made an extensive examination of
the legislative history and the administrative interpretation of the AFDC
program to explain why the policies behind Alabama's exclusions were
impermissible." The Chief Justice concluded that although such policies
may have justified the exclusions at the time of the inception of the
AFDC program, modern amendments to the Act29 emphasized that such
matters as immorality and illegitimacy are to be dealt with through
ancillary rehabilitative services rather than through a denial of assist-
ance.
30
Although King did invalidate the Alabama eligibility condition, the
decision left unclear exactly under what situations state-imposed eligi-
bility conditions would be invalidated in the 'future2' The confusion
appeared to be clarified by the interpretation placed on the King decision
24. The Alabama regulation provided that the income of any man who "cohabited"
with a needy child's mother was to be included in the child's resources for purposes
of determining need. 392 U.S. at 311.
25. Id. at 320.
26. Id. at 327.
27. Id. at 329-30. See also Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970), where the
Court held reasonable an HEW regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973), prohibiting
a state from presuming that the income of a stepfather is available to a child unless,
under state law, the stepfather has a legal obligation to support the child.
28. 392 U.S. at 325-26.
29. These amendments provided for rehabilitative services which include programs
for: the improvement of unsuitable homes, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (14) (1970); family
planning, id. § 602(a) (15), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972); and the establishment of
the paternity of illegitimate children, id. § 602(a) (17).
30. 392 U.S. at 326-27.
31. However, some lower courts had considered the ruling in King to be:
[A]bsent specific indications of Congressional authorizations for the states to
exclude a class of dependent children by narrowing a specific federally-imposed
eligibility factor, any state eligibility standards which exclude persons eligible
for assistance under the federal standards are in conflict with Congressional
intent and void under the federal statute.
Stoddard v. Fisher, 330 F. Supp. 566, 571-72 (D. Me. 1971); accord, Doe v. Hursh.
328 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1970); Woods v. Miller, 318 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Pa.
1970); Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Doe v. Shapiro, 302
F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969).
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in Townsend v. Swank.3 2 Townsend involved a challenge to an Illinois
statute limiting assistance for the eighteen to twenty-one age group to
individuals attending high school or vocational school and excluding
those in a college or university." Federal criteria state that a needy
child between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one regularly attending
a school, college, or university, or participating in vocational or technical
training is eligible for assistance. 4 The issue was whether states could
limit assistance within an age group to only a certain subclass of eligible
individuals. Justice Brennan concluded that although the Act's legisla-
tive history did show that whenever Congress extended AFDC eligibility
to older children, states were given the option of participating in the
new age group, there was no indication in that history to suggest Congress
intended to give the states "an option to tailor eligibility standards within
the age group . . . "" In holding the Illinois statute invalid, Justice
Brennan, referring to the earlier decision in King, noted:
King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of
congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced
from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state
eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance
under the federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security
Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause."8
The latest Supreme Court affirmation of the Townsend interpretation
of King came in 1972 in Carleson v. Remillard." In Carleson the issue
was whether absence for military service was within the meaning of the
term "continued absence from the home" found in the federal definition
of eligibility." California's adoption of a regulation 9 excluding absences
for military service from the definition of "continued absence" was
challenged. The Court's examination of the Act and its legislative history
produced no evidence of any congressional intent to limit "continued
absence" to situations of divorce or desertion, or of any congressional
authorization to exclude children whose parent is absent for military
32. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
35. 404 U.S. at 288.
36. Id. at 286.
37. 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
39. Calif. Dep't Soc. Welfare Reg. EAS § 42-350.11. The rule provided that a
"continued absence" did not exist when one parent was physically absent from the home
on a temporary basis. 406 U.S. at 599 n.1. Examples of such temporary absences cited
in the rule included visits, trips in connection with business, and active duty in the
military services.
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service."' In holding the California regulation invalid, Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, quoted with approval the Townsend inter-
pretation of King."'
The test which seemed to evolve through the King-Townsend-Carle-
son trilogy was one of "statutory entitlement;" i.e., that state conditions
which denied assistance to individuals eligible under the federal defini-
tions of eligibility were invalid unless the variance from the federal
standards was authorized by an expression of congressional intent in
either the Act or its legislative history. One federal district court stated
that after King, Townsend, and Carleson:
(1) The states may not impose more restrictive eligibility
conditions for receiving A. F. D. C. than those set out in the
Social Security Act;
(2) In order to exclude an applicant who would have been
covered under the Social Security Act, the state must rely upon
legisiative history or statutory language "clearly evidencing"
Congressional intent to allow the exclusion of the applicant;
(3) HEW regulations purporting to make eligibility for
certain groups of applicants optional with the states are of
no effect in the absence of Congressional intent to allow such ex-
clusions."3
Even HEW considered the Townsend interpretation of King to imply
that states could no longer vary eligibility standards from the federal
criteria without clear congressional authority.4"
40. 406 U.S. at 602.
41. The importance of our holding [in King] was stressed in Townsend v.
Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286:
"King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional
authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social
Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that
excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards
violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the
Supremacy Clause." (Emphasis supplied.)
406 U.S. at 600.
42. The "statutory entitlement" theory was succinctly stated by the district court
in King:
Aid to Dependent Children financial assistance is a statutory entitlement
under both the laws of Alabama and the Federal Social Security Act, and
where the child meets the statutory eligibility requirements he has a right to
receive financial benefits under the program.
277 F. Supp. 31, 38 (M.D. Ala. 1967), a! 'd, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See generally Note,
Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrinw of Statutory Entitlement, 44 Noln DAME
LAwYER 603 (1969).
43. Alcala v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Ia. 1973).
44. Although the implications of the King reasoning have not been entirely
clear until the decision in Tozwsend, it now appears that Section 402(a) (10)
339
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Although certain language in the King, Townsend, and Carleson
opinions does lend support to the "statutory entitlement" theory, the
holdings in those cases may be interpreted alternatively as supporting
a method of statutory construction which invalidated eligibility condi-
tions when they were inconsistent with the basic purposes of the AFDC
program. 6 As noted previously, the eligibility condition invalidated in
King was found to be inconsistent with the current efforts of the AFDC
program to deal with the problems of illegitimacy and immorality through
rehabilitation services rather than through the denial of assistance." The
eligibility condition invalidated in Tounsend was found to be inconsistent
with the express legislative intent to include "needy children under 21
who are regularly 'attending a school, college, or university.' "4 The
eligibility condition invalidated in Carleson might have been found incon-
sistent with the underlying purpose of assisting families which have no
control over their economic situation. 9 Such an interpretation leaves the
state the discretion to adopt eligibility conditions which vary from the
federal eligibility standards, even without express congressional authori-
zation, so long as they are consistent with the purposes and changing
focus of the AFDC program."
must be interpreted as federalizing State AFDC eligibility standards. Thus,
eligibility standards will have to fully implement the Federal matching
definitions unless there is clear evidence in the statute or its legislative history
that the State has a choice.
HEW, Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Townsend v. Swank and Alexander v.
Swank decided December 20, 1971, at 2 (undated) (unpublished memorandum written
between Dec. 20, 1971 and Jan. 28, 1972, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
45. See note 41 supra & text accompanying notes 36 & 41 supra.
46. For a pre-Dublino suggestion that the proper test for additional eligibility
conditions should be whether the challenged condition is consistent with the underlying
purposes of the AFDC program see Rosen v. Hursh, 464 F.2d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 1972).
HEW standards, embodied in the so-called "Condition X," prohibited state eligibility
standards not reasonably related to the purposes of the federal statute. See generally
AFDC Eligibility, supra note 2, at 1221-25; Comment, Welfare's "Condition X," 76
YALE L.J. 1222 (1967) [hereinafter cited as "Condition X"].
The term "Condition X" evolved from the agency's thought that its policy was
another conformity requirement for state plans in addition to the requirements set out
in § 2(a) of the various titles of the Act; hence, "condition 2(a)(x)" or "Condition
X." AFDC Eligibility, supra note 2, at 1221 n.24, citing F. White, Equitable Treatment
Under the Public Assistance Titles, Nov. 5, 1963, at 8 n.9. The White paper was
prepared by a research assistant at HEW and does not represent official HEW policy.
"Condition X," supra, at 1222 n.5.
47. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
48. 404 U.S. at 290, quoting S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1965).
49. 406 U.S. at 603-04.
50. The early legislative history of the AFDC program did suggest that states
may be allowed to adopt a few conditions not explicitly permitted by the Act, and
"impose such other eligibility requirements-as to means, moral character, etc.-as it
sees fit." H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935) ; S. REP. No. 628, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935). See also AFDC Eligibility, supra note 2, at 1230-31.
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Early suggestions of a weakening of the "statutory entitlement"
theory surfaced in Jefferson v. Hackney."' In Jefferson, Texas' method
of computing the ratable reduction factor 2 in determining welfare pay-
ments was challenged. The plaintiffs contended that the Texas method
was impermissible because it removed from the welfare rolls individuals
otherwise eligible for assistance under federal criteria.53 In upholding
the Texas system the Supreme Court acknowledged that states are forbid-
den from "creating certain exceptions to standards specifically enunciated
in the federal Act.""4 However, the Court noted that such a limitation
did not enact a "generalized federal criterion to which States must adhere
in their computation of standards of nevd, income, and benefits."5
Thus, Jefferson left to the states the discretion to reduce their
welfare rolls through manipulations of the standard of need. However,
the decision in Carleson was handed down one week after Jefferson. This
seemed to reaffirm the vitality of the Towmwend interpretation of King
and to suggest that reduction of welfare rolls through the imposition of
Although King's interpretation of the modern amendments focusing on rehabilitative
services implies that states may no longer adopt eligibility conditions related to moral
character, it does not necessarily follow that other categories of conditions would also
be impermissible.
51. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). See generally Note, What Remains of Federal AFDC
Standards After Jefferson v. Hackney?, 48 IND. L.J. 281 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
AFDC Standards].
52. Ratable reduction permits the state to pay only a certain percentage of the
recipient's need.
53. Although [the plaintiffs] are needy and meet the other characteristics
of dependency in § 406, and thus eligible under the federal test of § 406, they
have been denied AFDC payments by application of a state eligibility test
more narrow than § 406.
Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 3, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1970).
The challenged Texas method permitted the application of the reduction factor
prior to the subtraction of the recipient's income from the standard of need. 406 U.S.
at 539. For example, consider a family which meets the standards of 42 U.S.C. § 606
(1970) with a need of $200, income of $100, and residing in a state with a 50% ratable
reduction factor:
Texas Method Alternative Method
$200 (need) $200 (need)
X 50% (ratable reduction factor) - $100 (income)
$100 $100
- $100 (income) X 50% (ratable reduction factor)
0 (benefits) $ 50 (benefits)
See AFDC Standards, supra note 51, at 286 n.41. Using the alternative method, the
family would be eligible for AFDC benefits whereas using the Texas method, the same
family would be denied AFDC benefits.
54. 406 U.S. at 545.
55. Id.
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eligibility conditions unrelated to need remained impermissible."
NEw YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES V. DUBLINO
The Supreme Court decision in New York State Department of
Social Services v. Dublino"7 offers the latest challenge to interpreting the
King-Townsend-Carleson rule. At issue in Dublino was whether the New
York Work Rules58 were in conflict with the Act in general and the
Work Incentive Program (WIN) provisions59 of the AFDC program
in particular. The questions raised were whether states could adopt in-
dependent work programs for AFDC recipients, and, if so, whether the
state work programs could in effect provide additional conditions of
eligibility for AFDC recipients. Justice Powell's majority opinion focused
on the question of whether the federal WIN program pre-empted"0 the
area of work programs under AFDC; i.e., "whether Congress intended
WIN to provide the exclusive mechanism for establishing work rules
under AFDC."'" The Court held there was no pre-emption62 and re-
versed the three-judge district court's finding that the Work Rules were
invalid on this ground. 3 The case was remanded to the district court
to consider whether some particular sections of the Work Rules might
contravene specific provisions of the Act.64
Doubts concerning the continuing vitality of the statutory entitle-
ment test are raised by the Supreme Court's treatment of the district
court's opinion. The majority paid little attention to the lower court's
interpretation of the King-Townsend-Carleson test and to its conclusion
that a conflict between the Work Rules and the Act, however trivial,
makes the eligibility factor impermissible without express congressional
authorization. The lower court expressed its understanding of the King-
Townsend-Carleson test as:
56. AFDC Standards, supra note 51, at 287.
57. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
58. Ch. 102 [1971] N.Y. Laws 634, as aweded, N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 131(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (19), 630-44 (Supp. I, 1971).
60. As Justice Powell noted, the term "pre-emption" is used here in "a rather
special sense" since the Work Rules were adopted as part of the State's participation in
a federal program. 413 U.S. 411 n.9. Normally the pre-emption question is whether a
federal statute precludes the enactment of independent state legislation dealing with
the same area. However, having noted that Dublino does not present the classic case of
pre-emption, Justice Powell did not hesitate using pre-emption precedents. The
majority's use of pre-emption precedents was criticized by the dissent as inapposite.
Id. at 430 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 411 n.9.
62. Id. at 422.
63. Dublino v. New York State Dep't of Social Serv., 348 F. Supp. 290 (W.D.N.Y.
1972).
64. 413 U.S. at 422-23.
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[A] state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for'
assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social
Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy
Clause.65
Interpreting the King-Townsend-Carleson test to require the invalida-
tion of state eligibility conditions even slightly in conflict with the Act,
the court concluded that since there was an urauthorized conflict between
the Work Rules and the Act, the eligibility conditions provided by the
Work Rules were impermissible.66 However, Justice Powell's failure
to follow the lower court's interpretation of the King-Townsend-Carleson
test as well as his assertion that only substantial conflicts merit judicial
resolution 7 suggests that the nrere finding of a conflict between the eligi-
bility condition and the Act will not be sufficient to invalidate an incon-
sistent eligibility condition.
Furthermore, the Court used the following language to distinguish
Dublino from the King-Townend-Carleson trilogy:
In those cases [King, Townsend, Carleson] it was clear that
state law excluded people from AFDC benefits who the Social
Security Act expressly provided would be eligible. The Court
found no room 'either in the Act's language or legislative
history to warrant the State's additional eligibility require-
ments. Here, by contrast, the Act allows for complementary
state work incentive programs and procedures incident thereto
-even if they become conditions for continued assistance. 8
Justice Powell's interpretation of the three earlier cases effectively re-
verses their seeming presumption that state eligibility conditions are
invalid unless express congressional authorization is shown. justice
Powell treats the cases as holding that the Act clearly included these
recipients, while those cases themselves had seemed to rely on the fact
that the recipients had not been expressly excluded." In addition,
65. 348 F. Supp. at 295, quoting Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
66. 348 F. Supp. at 295.
67. In considering the question of possible conflict between the state and
federal work programs, the court below will take into account our prior
decisions. Congress "has given the States broad discretion," as to the AFDC
program, . . . and "[s]o long as the State's actions are not in violation of
any specific provision of the Constitution or the Social Security Act," the
courts may not void them. . . . Conflicts, to merit judicial rather than co-
operative federal-state resolution, should be of substance and not merely
trivial or insubstantial.
413 U.S. at 423 n.29 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 421-22.
69. See note 41 supra & text accompanying notes 36 & 41 supra. In his Dublino
343
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Justice Powell's conclusion that the Act allows for complementary work
programs "even if they become conditions for continued assistance""
would hardly seem to meet the requirement of clear evidence of con-
gressional intent necessary for the establishment of the validity of eligi-
bility conditions under previous interpretations of King, Townsend, and
Carleson. Justice Powell points -to no express congressional authori-
zation but infers that Congress intended to permit complementary work
programs from the limited operation of the WIN program."' Although
the majority opinion in Dublino did not overrule the earlier holdings in
King and its progeny,72 it could severely limit the potential impact of
those decisions.
These variations from previous interpretations of the King-Townsend-
Carleson trilogy suggest a shift in the method of determining the validity
of state-imposed eligibility conditions. Dublino may direct subjective
consideration of whether the challenged eligibility condition is consistent
with the policies and changing focus of the AFDC program as evidenced
by modern amendments, in place of the objective search of the Act or
its legislative history for clear expressions of congressional authorization.
Thus, Dublino would be recognition of state discretion in delineating
the scope of individual programs even in some cases where there is no
express congressional authorization. State eligibility conditions con-
sistent with the basic policies of the AFDC program would be permissible.
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Judicial response to Dublino has not been uniform." The confusion
dissent, Justice Marshall emphasized the importance of a clear statement of legislative
intent to permit variation from federal AFDC eligibility requirements.
In order to lessen the possibility that erroneous beliefs will lead state legis-
lators to single out politically unpopular recipients of assistance for harsh
treatment, Congress must clearly authorize States to impose conditions of
eligibility different from the federal standards.
413 U.S. at 432.
70. 413 U.S. at 422.
71. Id. at 418-21.
72. Id. at 423 n.29.
73. In Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), the court applied the
traditional interpretation of the King-Towwsend-Carleson test to the issue of whether
a state may exclude unborn children from the AFDC program. The court made a
search of the Act and its legislative history to determine whether there was clear
evidence of congressional authorization for the exclusion of unborn children from the
AFDC program. The court noted that the resolution of this issue under the King-
Townsend-Carleson test was not altered by Dublino, stating that in Dzdblino the
"[Supreme] Court reaffirmed the trilogy [King-Townsend-Carleson] holding that states
may not exclude from AFDC benefits those eligible under the Social Security
Act ..... " Id. at 827 n.5; accord, Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind.
1973). A second approach views Dublino as establishing new standards for eligibility
conditions connected with state work programs:
THE IMPACT OF DUBLINO
over how Dublino relates to other AFDC eligibility issues stems from
the combination of the Court's willingness to reaffirm the holdings of
King, Townsend, and Carleson and its eagerness to place a new inter-
pretation on those holdings. Admittedly, the Kiog-Tounsend-Carleson
cases do support an alternative method of statutory interpretation
which would permit greater state discretion in adopting additional con-
ditions of eligibility.74 But if this is the path chosen by Dublino, its" failure
to establish adequate standards for controlling future use of this greater
state discretion is a major weakness.
Justice Powell's inspection of the policies of the AFDC program"5
to support his contention that states may adopt complementary state work
programs even if they become additional conditions of eligibility78 does
suggest that a state eligibility condition must be consistent with some
purpose of the program. However, Justice Powell satisfies himself
with the finding of a single policy and pays little attention to the overall
focus of the program. A better approach was used by Chief Justice
Warren in King.7 The Chief Justice there recognized that while the
Act had many underlying policies, not all of them were intended to
be implemented by manipulating conditions of eligibility." Similarly,
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Dublino appreciated the complexity of
AFDC. He saw the WIN program as "designed to accommodate
Congt'ess' dual interests in, guarante6ing the integrity of the family
and maximizing the potential for employment og recipients of public
assistance. 7M Likewise the entire AFDC program can be viewed as an
attempt to accommodate several antagonistic congressional interests in
a single program. It would be a difficult judicial chore to require the
[T]he Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the states have some latitude
in formulating their own employment rules . . . may indicate that such in-
consistencies with the federal law as will justify invalidation must be more
substantial than suggested by the district courts in either Dublino or the instant
case.
Jeffries v. Sugarman, 481 F.2d 414, 417 (2d Cir. 1973). A third approach has been to
extend the latitude noted in Dublino beyond the scope of work programs. Doe v.
Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973).
74. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
75. 413 U.S. at 418-21.
76. Id. at 422.
77. In King, Chief Justice Warren emphasized the changing focus of the AFDC
program:
The most recent congressional amendments to the Social Security Act
further corroborate that federal public welfare policy now rests on a basis
considerably more sophisticated and enlightened than the "worthy-person"
concept of earlier times.
392 U.S. at 324-25.
78. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
79. 413 U.S. at 428.
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weighing of conflicting AFDC policies.-s However, to permit the vali-
dation of an eligibility condition only because it is consistent with an
underlying policy of the AFDC program, without consideration of the
relationship of that policy to the overall focus of the AFDC program,
may produce results not intended by Congress.
A recent district court decision illustrates the problems created by
following Justice Powell's approach which does not require considera-
tion of the basic objectives of the AFDC program. The court in Doe
v. Norton" was asked to determine the validity of a Connecticut statute
permitting incarceration for contempt of a mother of an illegitimate
child receiving AFDC benefits if she failed to give welfare officials the
name of the putative father of the child. 2 Relying on Dublino,8" the three
judge district court held the Connecticut statute valid since it was con-
sistent with an underlying policy of the AFDC program "of determining
the paternity of those needy children born out of wedlock""' and did
not violate any specific provisions of the Act.8" It is hard to imagine
that the incarceration of the mother and the resulting separation of mother
and child would be consistent with the underlying policy of maintaining
family integrity mentioned in the statement of purpose of the program6
and reiterated by Justice Marshall in Dublino.Y In validating the Con-
necticut statute, the court failed to recognize that 'the policy of deter-
mining the paternity of illegitimate needy children could be subordinate
to the broader policy of maintaining family integrity. 8
80. Dublino suggests a partial solution to the problem of balancing the policies
of the AFDC program. The courts could retreat from judicial intervention in eligibility
disputes in favor of "cooperative federal-state resolution" when the conflict between
the state eligibility condition and the Act is minor. Id. at 423 n.29.
81. 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973).
82. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-440b (Supp. 1973). Until recently, there seemed
to be little support for state eligibility conditions which required a mother's cooperation
in the determination of the paternity of illegitimate children as the result of a series
of decisions, some of which were summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. E.g.,
Meyers v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), aff'd mene., 404 U.S. 803 (1971).
83. 365 F. Supp. at 70-73.
84. Id. at 71.
85. Id. at 73.
86. For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish finan-
cial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under
the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or rela-
tives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and
to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum
self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of
continuing parental care and protection . ...
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
87. 413 U.S. at 427-30.
88. The court completely missed that line of analysis in seeking to determine
THE IMPACT OF DUBLINO
As Doe illustrates, closer attention should be given to the interplay
of the conflicting policies of the AFDC program before rushing to validate
a state-imposed eligibility condition merely because it is consistent with
a single purpose of the program. If the Supreme Court is no longer
willing to accept the full extent Df the constraints which previous infer-
pretations of the King-To insend-Carleson trilogy placed on state imposi-
tion of eligibility conditions unrelated to need, the Court must at least
adopt sufficient standards to prevent helter-skelter validation of additional
eligibility conditions.
CONCLUSION
Dublino may result in an increase in the amount of discretion which
federal courts will permit states in imposing additional conditions for
AFDC eligibility. However, since the AFDC program is the product
of the tension created by antagonistic congressional goals, the proper
question to be considered in reviewing the greater state discretion should
be whether the eligibility condition is consistent with both an underlying
policy of the AFDC program and the overall focus of the program.
JOHN TIMOTHY McCAULAY
whether an additional condition of eligibility had been imposed. The court contended
that the incarceration of the mother was not an additional condition of eligibility,
stating:
While the incarceration of a contemptuous mother may not always be in
her child's best interest, this does not establish any irreconcible conflict
between the two acts.
365 F. Supp. at 73. Even accepting this formulation of the issue in the case the court
may have been wrong. It could be argued that the threat of incarceration has the same
effect as an additional condition of eligibility in molding the recipients behavior in
order to receive full enjoyment of AFDC benefits.
